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1The Spirit of Capitalism and International Risk Sharing
Abstract
We show that a model of the spirit of capitalism can generate a high degree of international
risk sharing as measured by the discount-factor-based approach of Brandt, Cochrane, and
Santa-Clara (2001), even when consumption and portfolio holdings exhibit “home bias”. We
also show how portfolio externalities can arise in the model, and highlight the caution that
one needs in interpreting discount-factor-based measures of international risk sharing: in the
presence of portfolio externalities, even when the measured degree of risk sharing is perfect, it
is still possible for government policies to induce investors to hold better-diversiﬁed portfolios
and attain higher welfare.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: G11; G15; F41.
Keywords: The spirit of capitalism; International risk sharing; Discount factor; Portfolio
externality.
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
Using consumption or portfolio data, as well as speciﬁc assumptions on investor preferences, a
long literature concludes that the degree of international risk sharing is far from perfect. Since
the beneﬁt of risk sharing seems too high to be oﬀset by observable costs of foreign investment,
the lack of international diversiﬁcation has often been called the “home bias puzzle”.1
In contrast with this literature, Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2001) propose a novel
approach that does not require any preference assumptions to measure the degree of interna-
tional risk sharing. The authors use asset price data to infer the co-movement between diﬀerent
countries’ discount factors, and ﬁnd that they are highly correlated. This result implies that
the extent of international risk sharing is in fact much higher than that suggested by previous
studies.
We show that a model that incorporates the “spirit of capitalism” can reconcile the seem-
ingly contradictory results from the two approaches. By the “spirit of capitalism”, we are
referring to Weber’s (1948) idea that investors accumulate wealth not only for consumption,
but also for wealth-induced social status:
Man is dominated by the making of money, by acquisition as the ultimate purpose of his
life. Economic acquisition is no longer subordinated to man as the means for the satisfaction of
his material needs. This reversal of what we should call the natural relationship, so irrational
from a naive point of view, is evidently a leading principle of capitalism.–—Max Weber, The
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1948, p. 53)
Keynes (1972) expresses a similar idea:
[Needs] fall into two classes–those which are absolute in the sense that we feel them
whatever the situation of our fellow human beings may be, and those which are relative in the
1See Lewis (1999) for a recent survey of this literature.
3sense that we feel them only if their satisfaction lifts us above, makes us feel superior to, our
fellows.–—John M. Keynes, Essays in Persuasion (1972, p. 326)
Bakshi and Chen (1996) and Smith (2001) examine the spirit of capitalism in a closed-
economy setting. Here, in an international environment, we postulate that the spirit of capi-
talism has an important country-related component. Due to closer interactions among residents
of the same country and media coverage at the national level, the benchmark relative to which
investors calculate their wealth status can be country speciﬁc. In this case, the portfolio that
investors need to hold in order to hedge variations in the benchmark will also be country
speciﬁc.
A key insight of the Brandt et al.’s approach is that regardless of the speciﬁcf o r mt h a t
investor preferences take, perfect risk sharing implies that investors from diﬀerent countries
will optimize their consumption and portfolio choices until their marginal rates of substitution
are equalized. In particular, if preferences are non-standard, it is possible for risk sharing to be
perfect (in the sense that investors’ intertemporal marginal rates of substitution are equalized)
even when investors’ consumption and portfolio exhibit bias relative to those obtained from
the conventional, power utility setup. We show that this is indeed the case for our model of
the spirit of capitalism.
We also show that the spirit of capitalism can lead to external eﬀects in investors’ portfolio
choice. Suppose some local agents are constrained from participating in international ﬁnancial
markets.2 To the extent that their wealth aﬀects the domestic benchmark, their home bias
can induce unconstrained investors from the same country to hold biased portfolios as well.
In this way, the spirit of capitalism can serve as a channel through which portfolio biases
2These constrained agents can represent investors who are endowed with only human capital or entrepre-
neurial wealth (which behave like domestic stocks), and are borrowing-constrained for moral hazard reasons.
They can also be investors who face high actual or perceived costs of foreign investment, such as transactions
costs, information asymmetries, or psychological biases.
4that directly aﬀect only a subset of agents are transmitted to other members in the economy.
The unconstrained investors from the home country choose to hold biased portfolios–even
when they are sharing risks perfectly, in the marginal utility sense, with other unconstrained
investors from abroad.
This result leads to an important implication for the interpretation of the discount-factor-
based measure of international risk sharing. Speciﬁcally, the degree of risk sharing that this
approach measures is subject to a given structure of portfolio externalities. We show that even
when the discount-factor-based measure suggests that international risk sharing is perfect
among the unconstrained investors, it is possible for government policies that aim at removing
the participation constraints of the constrained investors to induce the unconstrained investors
to hold better-diversiﬁed portfolios and attain higher welfare. In other words, even when risk
sharing is already “perfect”, further improvements in risk sharing are still possible.
DeMarzo, Kaniel, and Kremer (2003) and Shore and White (2002) also examine the role
of externalities in portfolio choice. Agents in DeMarzo et al.’s model have no direct concern
for status, but portfolio externalities arise from agents’ competition for scarce local resources.
Investors in Shore’s and White’s study exhibit external habit persistence, so that one agent’s
consumption has an external eﬀect on the utility of other agents. These consumption external-
ities lead to portfolio externalities. Duﬂo and Saez (2002) and Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2003)
report empirical evidence of peer eﬀects in portfolio choice. Dumas and Uppal (2001) examine
the eﬀect of the imperfect mobility of goods on international risk sharing.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model of the
spirit of capitalism. Section 3 discusses the model’s implications for international risk sharing.
Section 4 examines the role of portfolio externalities, and their implications for the interpre-
tation of discount-factor-based measures of international risk sharing. Section 5 concludes.
52 A Model of the Spirit of Capitalism
2.1 Preferences
The “spirit of capitalism” induces investors to be concerned with their relative wealth status.
We model this concern with a speciﬁcation that Bakshi and Chen (1996) suggest. For an
investor in country i, her utility is given by










where Ci,t,W i,t are the investor’s own consumption and wealth at time t, and Vi,t is a “social
wealth index”–the benchmark relative to which the investor compares herself. When the
investor prefers higher status, the permissible range for the parameters is λ ≥ 0 when γ ≥ 1,
and λ < 0 when 0 < γ < 1. The absolute value of the parameter λ measures the extent to
which the investor cares about relative wealth status. The diﬀerence between our speciﬁcation
and Bakshi’s and Chen’s is our international setting. In particular, we assume that the social
wealth index Vi,t is country-speciﬁc–investors in the same country compare themselves to the
same norm or reference level.
2.2 Asset Returns
We consider a world with N +1constant-returns-to-scale technologies, the ﬁrst N of which
are risky, have constant expected returns and volatilities, and are imperfectly correlated. The
N +1 st technology is riskless, with a rate of return r. We assume that ﬁnancial markets are
complete, and none of the assets are redundant. The cumulative real value of a unit investment
in risky technology j follows a geometric Brownian motion:
dPj,t
Pj,t
= µjdt + σjdzj,t (2)
for j =1 ,...,N. µ j is the expected return on asset j, σ2
j its instantaneous variance, and dzj,t
a standard Wiener process. The instantaneous correlation structure of the Wiener processes









, dzt ≡ [σjdzj,t],a n d
dPt
Pt ≡ µdt + dzt as N × 1 column vectors.
2.3 Consumption and Portfolio Choice




= µv,idt + σv,idzv,i,t. (3)
Since markets are complete, it is possible to perfectly hedge the stochastic movements in Vi by
holding a portfolio of the N +1assets. We call this portfolio the replicating portfolio of Vi,
and denote its weights in the N risky technologies as an N ×1 column vector b αi. Speciﬁcally,
σ2
v,i ≡ b α
0
iΣb αi,a n dµv,i = r + b α
0
i (µ − r1) − θi, where θi is a non-negative constant.
Taking the Vi process as given, an investor from country i makes her consumption and




e−βtU (Ci,t,W i,t,V i,t)dt
¾
. (4)
Denoting her portfolio weights as αi,w ec a nd e ﬁne the value function of this maximization
problem as:





e−β(s−t)U (Ci,s,W i,s,V i,s)ds
¾
, (5)
subject to dWi,t = {Wi,t [r + α0







σw,i ,a n dαi(j) denotes the jth element of αi. This value function gives the
maximum expected lifetime utility attainable by a country i investor when her own private
wealth and country i’s social wealth index are equal to Wi,t and Vi,t respectively.
7The ﬁrst-order condition for (5) with respect to Ci and αi yields
JW (Wi,t,V i,t)=UC (Ci,t,W i,t,V i,t) (6)
0 = JW (µ − r1)+JWWWiΣαi + JVWΨ, (7)
where Ψ =( σ1vi,...,σNvi)
0 is a vector of the covariances of each of the N risky assets with the






















Even before solving explicitly for J, we can see that the concern for status creates a hedging
demand in investors’ portfolio. This hedging component is given by the second term in equa-
tion (8), and motivates the dependence of individual portfolio holdings αi on the replicating
portfolio weights b αi of country i’s social wealth index.
Before proceeding further, it is useful to derive more economic content from equation (8).
First, note that −JW













RRA , where JVW
Vi,t
JW is the elasticity of JW with respect to Vi.
The following proposition solves an investor’s consumption-portfolio problem explicitly:
Proposition 1 Let investor utility be given by (1). Then, the solution to the consumption-




























r(γ − 1) +
γ+λ−1
2(γ+λ) (µ − r1)
0 Σ−1 (µ − r1)
− λ
γ+λ (µ − r1)








ηi > 0, γ + λ > 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
The restrictions ηi > 0, γ + λ > 1 are derived from the transversality condition of the
optimization problem. Since our solution requires that γ + λ > 1, we restrict our analysis to
the range of parameter values, γ ≥ 1 and λ ≥ 0. At the same time, the elasticity of JW with
respect to Vi is given by λ. Finally, the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion (RRA)i se q u a lt o
γ + λ, 3 and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS)i se q u a lt o 1
γ+λ.4




= µw,idt + σw,idzw,i,t, (13)
where µw,i = r + α0
i (µ − r1) − ηi, σ2
w,i ≡ α0




σw,i ,a n dαi(j) denotes





Thus, we can write
dCi,t
Ci,t
= µc,idt + σc,idzc,i,t, (14)
where µc,i = µw,i, σc,i = σw,i, and dzc,i,t = dzw,i,t.
3RRA =
−Wi,tJWW
JW = γ + λ.





d[u0(cs)/u0(ct)]. Taking the limit as s → t gives EIS =
−u0(ct)








= −rdt− µ0Σ−1dzt (15)
















Moreover, since markets are complete, this discount factor is unique.
3 International Risk Sharing
Equation (10) above shows the dependence of individual portfolio choice on the social wealth
index. The ﬁrst term in the equation, 1
γ+λΣ−1 (µ − r1), represents an “unbiased” portfolio
that a power-utility investor (with RRA = γ + λ) will hold. We denote this term as α, and
note that it is a common component in the portfolio of all investors, regardless of their country
of origin. The second term in equation (10), λ
γ+λ b αi, represents the incentive an investor from
country i has in imitating b αi, the replicating portfolio of her own country’s social wealth index.
In particular, if b αi is “biased” towards asset j (i.e., overweight asset j relative to α), αi will
also be biased towards the same asset. In turn, this portfolio bias induces a bias in the processes
for Wi,t and Ci,t, in the sense that they are now aﬀected even by diversiﬁable, idiosyncratic
shocks that hit technology j. By contrast, in a world with no concern for status (i.e., λ =0 ) , all
investors hold the same diversiﬁed portfolio α, and there are no country-speciﬁcc o m p o n e n t s
in their consumption and wealth processes.
103.1 Portfolio Bias and Risk Sharing
When the social wealth indexes (and hence the corresponding replicating portfolios b αi)a r e
diﬀerent across countries, investors’ portfolio and consumption allocations will contain country-
speciﬁc components. In this case, traditional portfolio- and consumption-based measures of
international risk sharing, by comparing αi and Ci,t with the full-diversiﬁcation benchmark
under power utility, will conclude that risk sharing is incomplete.
Yet, by examining the model’s discount factor, we obtain a markedly diﬀerent conclusion.
We show above that the discount factor given by equation (15) is not country speciﬁc. In
other words, the growth rates of marginal utility are equalized across investors from diﬀerent
countries, and discount-factor-based measures will conclude that the degree of international risk
sharing is perfect. This result holds regardless of whether there are country-speciﬁc variations
in the social wealth index, and hence country-speciﬁc components in investors’ consumption
and portfolio choice. In particular, “home bias” in consumption and portfolio choice can be
consistent with perfect risk sharing (as measured by the discount factor).
3.2 From Biased Consumption to Perfect Risk Sharing: Inspecting the
Mechanism
To obtain a deeper understanding of how the diﬀerent consumption and portfolio choices across
countries translate into perfect co-movements in marginal rates of substitution, we express the
discount factor in the more familiar, discrete-time convention, and in terms of an investor’s







: t =0 ,∆t,...
o
represent an optimal plan for (4). To derive the discrete-
time Euler equation, we follow a variational argument in Grossman and Shiller (1982). For
an investor from country i who sells s∆t units of asset j at time t, consumes the proceeds
in the same period, and buys the s∆t units of asset j back at time t + ∆t (by reducing her



































i,t to be optimal, (16) must be minimized at s =0 . This requirement implies

































Setting ∆t =1 , we obtain the discrete-time stochastic discount factor for investors from country
i:
Mi,t+1 = e−βUC (Ci,t+1,W i,t+1,V i,t+1)+UW (Ci,t+1,W i,t+1,V i,t+1)



































where the last equality follows from the fact that the consumption-wealth ratio is constant.
Using this expression for the discount factor, we compute Brandt et al.’s (2001) risk sharing
index between countries d and f, given by
1 −
σ2 (lnMf,t+1 − lnMd,t+1)
σ2 (lnMf,t+1)+σ2 (lnMd,t+1)
.
To show that risk sharing between the two countries is perfect, it suﬃces to demonstrate that
the stochastic components of lnMf,t+1 and lnMd,t+1 are the same, so that σ2 (lnMf,t+1 − lnMd,t+1)
equals zero. From equation (17), and the processes for Vi and Wi deﬁned above in equations
















γ+λ b αi (j)
´
σjdzj,t, and σv,idzv,i,s =
N P
j=1
b αi (j)σjdzj,t, where α ≡ 1
γ+λΣ−1 (µ − r1) is the common component in the portfolio of









which is identical across countries. Thus, indeed, for any two countries d and f, the stochastic
components of lnMf,t+1 and lnMd,t+1 are the same, and σ2 (lnMf,t+1 − lnMd,t+1) equals zero.
In other words, even though there are country-speciﬁc variations in consumption, wealth,
and the social wealth index, they enter the discount factor in a way that exactly oﬀsets one
another, and only the component that is common across countries remains. The economics
behind this result is simple. With complete markets, investors from diﬀerent countries make
their consumption and portfolio choice to share risk perfectly–in the marginal-utility sense–
subject to variations in their country-speciﬁc social wealth index.
4C o u n t r y - S p e c i ﬁc Variations in the Social Wealth Index: A
Simple Example
Our analysis so far has focused on the eﬀects of country-speciﬁc variations in the social wealth
index on investors’ consumption and portfolio allocations. Here, we examine why there are
country-speciﬁc variations in the social wealth index in the ﬁrst place.
We consider a special case of our model that has two countries and two risky production
technologies, where technology i is located in country i, for i =1 ,2. In addition to the two
risky technologies, there is also a riskless technology that can be used in both countries. We
assume that the returns on the two risky technologies have the same mean and volatility, but
are imperfectly correlated. We denote their common mean and volatility as µ and σ,a n dt h e i r
covariance as σ12. As before, the rate of return of the riskless technology is given by r.
To keep the analysis tractable, we assume that each country is populated by two agents: a
13constrained agent (Agent C) and an unconstrained agent (Agent U).5 Agent C faces a binding
participation constraint in international ﬁnancial markets, and holds the domestic and the
riskless assets only. Agent U faces no participation constraints, but has the spirit of capitalism
preferences given by equation (1) above, and uses the wealth of Agent C as her social wealth
index. Thus, even though Agent U does not face any direct cost of foreign investment, she will
not hold the fully-diversiﬁed portfolio α–since her social wealth index (the wealth of Agent
C) contains the domestic and the riskless assets only. Instead, the “home bias” in Agent C’s
portfolio (denoted by b α above) induces Agent U’s portfolio to be home-biased as well.
Since it is only the unconstrained agents in each country who participate in international
ﬁnancial markets, they are the marginal investors whose preferences are reﬂected in the equi-
librium discount factor. As we discuss above, in complete markets, these unconstrained agents
from diﬀerent countries share risks perfectly–subject to the country-speciﬁcv a r i a t i o n si nt h e i r
social wealth indexes (i.e., the wealth of the constrained agents located in their own countries).
There are a number of possible interpretations of who the constrained agents represent
in reality. First, they can represent those local residents who are endowed with only human
capital or entrepreneurial wealth (which behave like domestic stocks), and are borrowing-
constrained for moral hazard reasons. Second, they can represent investors who face high
actual or perceived costs of international investment. Actual costs can include information
asymmetries, transactions costs, taxes, and exchange-rate risks. Perceived costs include various
behavioral biases, such as agents’ reluctance to participate in “unfamiliar” gambles, or hold
“unfamiliar” assets.6
5With more agents, additional state variables have to be introduced to keep track of the relative levels of
wealth among them.
6Black (1974) and Stulz (1981) study transactions costs and taxes on foreign asset holdings. Cooper and
Kaplanis (1994), Stockman and Dellas (1989), and Uppal (1993) examine the eﬀects of exchange-rate risks.
Brennan and Cao (1997), Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001), Huberman (2001), Kang and Stulz (1997), and
Uppal and Wang (2003) study the roles of information asymmetries and behavioral biases. See also the survey
144.1 Welfare Eﬀects of Changing the Degree of Bias in the Social Wealth
Index
From equation (10) above, it is easy to see that the removal of biases from the social wealth
index induces Agent U to hold a fully-diversiﬁed portfolio, i.e., when b α is proportional to α,
Agent U’s portfolio becomes proportional to α as well. Less clear, however, is whether such
a change improves Agent U’s welfare. Intuitively, there are two eﬀects that go in opposite di-
rections. The ﬁrst is the usual diversiﬁcation eﬀect: the better-diversiﬁed portfolio that Agent
U holds after the change leads to a more favorable risk-return trade-oﬀ that improves welfare.
The second is the spirit of capitalism eﬀect. Since Agent U receives utility from “outperform-
ing” Agent C, and it becomes more diﬃcult to outperform when Agent C’s portfolio is less
biased, Agent U can become worse oﬀ as a result of the change.
We investigate the relative importance of these two eﬀects by examining the value function
J given by equation (11) above. Wi,t represents the wealth of Agent U in country i,a n dVi,t
represents the wealth of Agent C in the same country–as Agent U uses Agent C’s wealth as
her social wealth index. For given values of Wi,t, Vi,t, and preference parameters γ and λ,
Agent U’s welfare depends on her own consumption-wealth ratio ηi. T h es i z eo fηi, in turn,
depends on b αi and θi (see equation (12) above), which correspond in our example here to Agent
C’s portfolio holdings and consumption-wealth ratio respectively. Thus, how these quantities
change as a result of the removal of biases in Agent C’s portfolio determines Agent U’s welfare.
To know how these quantities respond, we have to specify Agent C’s preferences. Here, we





1−γ−λ , where Ct is her own consumption at time t. We choose this particular speciﬁ-
cation for the relatively simple consumption and portfolio rules that it generates. Our purpose
is only to show that even for a simple speciﬁcation such as this, whether the diversiﬁcation or
by Lewis (1999).
15the spirit of capitalism eﬀect dominates is still ambiguous, and depends on the relative size of
certain preference parameters.
On Table 1, we report the portfolio choice (b α1) and consumption-wealth ratio (θ1) of Agent
C in country 1, both in the case when the agent’s participation constraint in international
markets is binding, and in the case when the constraint is removed. Note that for this agent,
asset 1 is her domestic asset. Since the derivation of these results is standard, we omit the
proofs, which are available from the authors on request.
Using results from the table, we can express Agent U’s consumption-wealth ratio in terms of
our model’s parameters, both when Agent C faces an international participation constraint, and
when the constraint is removed. We denote these two consumption-wealth ratios as η1,constrained
and η1,unconstrained respectively. To evaluate η1,constrained (η1,unconstrained), we only need to
substitute the values of b α1,constrained and θ1,constrained (b α1,unconstrained and θ1,unconstrained)
from Table 1 into equation (12) above. In particular, it is straightforward to show that
η1,unconstrained − η1,constrained =
(µ − r)
2 (σ2 − σ12)
(γ + λ)











We are interested in this quantity because from equation (11) above, we see that for γ,
λ > 0,a n dγ + λ > 1, the value function J is increasing in ηi, and this observation im-
plies that relaxing the participation constraint of Agent C is welfare-improving for Agent U if
η1,unconstrained − η1,constrained > 0. From equation (19), this condition is satisﬁed if
(γ + λ)
2 − 2(γ + λ) − λ > 0.
This expression shows quantitatively what we have discussed above intuitively–whether
relaxing the participation constraint of Agent C is welfare-improving for Agent U depends on
the strength of the spirit of capitalism eﬀect. In particular, when λ is small relative to γ (so
that the spirit of capitalism eﬀect is relatively weak), the improved diversiﬁcation associated
with the change raises Agent U’s welfare. On the other hand, when λ is large relative to γ (so
16that the desire for Agent U to outperform Agent C is strong), the change can actually lower
Agent U’s welfare–as the removal of Agent C’s portfolio constraint makes it more diﬃcult for
Agent U to outperform Agent C.
4.2 Implications for the Interpretation of Discount-Factor-Based Measures
of Risk Sharing
Our ﬁndings from the previous section suggests that one has to exercise caution when in-
terpreting discount-factor-based measures of risk sharing. The ﬁrst point is obvious. The
equilibrium discount factor that researchers can infer from asset prices applies only to the
unconstrained investors who participate in international ﬁnancial markets. In our example
above, even though the unconstrained investors are sharing risks perfectly with each other, the
constrained investors are not.
The second point is more subtle. Even though the constrained investors’ intertemporal
marginal rates of substitution do not price the diﬀerent assets across countries, these investors
can still play an important role in the economy’s equilibrium–as their portfolios can exert an
external eﬀect on those of the unconstrained investors. The externality arises when constrained
investors only take into account their own beneﬁt when deciding whether or not to participate
in international ﬁnancial markets, without internalizing the eﬀects their portfolio allocations
have on other agents in the economy.
Thus, even when discount-factor-based measures suggest that the prevailing degree of risk
sharing is perfect, there can still be room for further risk sharing. This point is obvious
for the constrained investors, whose intertemporal marginal rate of substitution is diﬀerent
from that of the market equilibrium. A more surprising result is that this point also holds
for the unconstrained investors. Even though their discount factors are already equal to
that of the market equilibrium to begin with, the unconstrained investors can still adjust
17to better-diversiﬁed portfolios and attain higher welfare when the constrained investors be-
come less biased. In the context of our example above, this scenario arises when the condition
η1,unconstrained − η1,constrained > 0 is satisﬁed.
This result implies that even the unconstrained investors can beneﬁtf r o mg o v e r n m e n t
policies (such as investor education or actual subsidies to encourage portfolio diversiﬁcation)
that aim at reducing the portfolio bias of the constrained investors. This conclusion holds
even though discount-factor-based measures suggest that the existing degree of risk sharing
among the unconstrained investors is already perfect. On the other hand, if η1,unconstrained −
η1,constrained < 0, policies that remove portfolio biases in the constrained investors will actually
lower the welfare of the unconstrained.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Even when investors are sharing risks perfectly in the marginal utility sense, the spirit of
capitalism in investor utility together with country-speciﬁc variations in the social wealth
index can give rise to “home bias” in investors’ consumption and portfolio choice. Thus, high
degrees of international risk sharing according to discount-factor-based measures (as reported
by Brandt et al. 2001) can be consistent with low correlations of cross-country consumption
growth rates.
We also show that the degree of international risk sharing that researchers obtain from
discount-factor-based measures is subject to the existing structure of portfolio externalities
in the economy. For example, the home-biased portfolios of constrained investors can be an
externality that induces unconstrained investors to hold biased portfolios as well. Even when
researchers ﬁnd that the degree of international risk sharing is perfect using the discount-factor
approach, the result only implies that risk sharing is perfect conditional on existing portfolio
externalities. If government policies can induce the constrained investors to hold less biased
18portfolios, the unconstrained investors will also become better diversiﬁed, and can see their
welfare improve as a result.
19Appendix. Proof of Proposition 1
We solve the investor’s consumption-portfolio problem using the solution technique of Mer-
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i (µ − r1)] − Ci,t}
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iΣb αi − βJ
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
, (20)
the ﬁrst-order conditions of which are stated in equations (6) and (7). For an investor with
the utility function displayed in equation (1), we solve explicitly for her optimal consumption
and portfolio decisions assuming the social wealth index Vi,t follows the process stated in










, and then substituting it into equations (6), (7) and (20), we can
solve jointly for C∗
i,t, α∗
i,t and ηi. ¥
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